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Abstract 
The new BPS Guidance on the Assessment and Diagnosis of Intellectual 
Disabilities in Adulthood are reviewed. It is argued that the continuation 
of IQ cutoff points and the introduction of adaptive behaviour cut off 
points are not justified if current research on our ability to measure 
these two variables is properly considered. The greater emphasis on 
clinical judgment is welcomed.   
 
 
The new BPS “Guidance on the Assessment and Diagnosis of Intellectual 
Disabilities in Adulthood”, published in 2015 (BPS 2015), produced by a 
working group of the Faculty for People with Intellectual Disabilities, 
replaces the old guidance (BPS 2000). The need for an update seems to 
have been precipitated by of a number of factors:   The three international recognised diagnostic definitions of 
Intellectual Disability (ID) (AAIDD-11, DSM-V and ICD-11) 
have all been recently updated or are about to be updated. 
One of the stated aims of the working group was to have a 
UK definition of ID in line with these definitions.   Recent UK legislation, notably the Mental Health Act 2007, 
and the Mental Capacity Act 2005, may lead to psychologists 
being asked to assess individuals suspected of having an 
intellectual disability.   There has been debate in the literature as to how a 
definition should be framed, in particular whether a 
measured IQ score should be part of the definition.  
 
The working group tried not to work in isolation, consulting with faculty 
members and holding two conferences in 2013, in London and Glasgow.  
The views of members were sought and critics of the current system 
were able to air their views at the conferences. However, although 
resulting guidance does differ from the old one, for example, the 
possibility that IQ tests are not as accurate as we previously thought is 
acknowledged, the collection of background information is emphasised 
and the use of clinical judgment is given more prominence, this is mainly a 
change in emphasis rather than substance. It seems to the current 
author that, although the definition of ID adopted is consistent with 
internationally recognised definitions, the working group has not taken 
sufficient account of recent work on how accurately low IQ and adaptive 
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functioning can be measured and has missed an opportunity to produce 
radically different and more effective definition and guidance.   
 
The definition of ID 
The definition of ID used in the new guidance is essentially the same as in 
the old ones and is very much in line with the internationally recognised 
definition outlined in AAIDD-11, DSM-V and ICD-10/11:  
 
“Intellectual disability is defined as significant impairment in intellectual 
functioning and significant impairment in adaptive functioning (social 
functioning), with each of these impairments beginning prior to 
adulthood.” (P 2).  
 
Further details as to what is meant by significant impairments in 
intellectual and adaptive functioning and age of onset are then given.  
 
A significant impairment in intellectual functioning is “best represented 
by an IQ score derived from an appropriately standardised and norm-
referenced assessment measure that is more that two SDs below the 
population mean, allowing for the expected level of measurement error 
within the test” (P 12-13).   
 
A significant impairment in adaptive functioning (social functioning), in 
line with AAIDD-11, is defined as: “best represented by a score derived 
from an appropriately standardized and norm-referenced assessment 
measure that encompasses either: (i) any one; or (ii) all three of the 
domains of conceptual, practical, and social skills that is more than two 
SDs below the population mean, allowing for the expected level of 
measurement error within the test concerned” (P. 14). 
 
With regard to the requirement the disabilities should appear before 
adulthood, it says “This disability originates before age 18” (P. 14).  
 
The most obvious problems with this definition are as follows:    
  
IQ cut off points are still part of the definition 
Having an IQ below 2 SDs or IQ 70 is still a part of the definition. 
Although this is consistent with the internationally recognised definition 
of ID there are a number of issues with it that have recently been 
highlighted in the literature (e.g. Whitaker 2008a, 2013 Webb and 
Whitaker 2012). 
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First, IQ 70 or 2 SDs below the mean, is an arbitrary figure, chosen as it 
is two nice whole numbers (70 and 2), rather than because there is any 
empirical evidence that people with measured IQs less than 70 are 
particularly less able to cope than those with measured IQs between 75 
and 80.  
  
Second, there is now evidence that IQ tests, partially when used in the 
low range, are not as accurate as the four to five points that their 
manuals claim they are. This means that categorising individuals as having 
a true intellectual ability either above or below 70, on the basis of a 
measured IQ, is often going to be wrong (see Whitaker 2015 for more 
details of this). On the one hand, the working group were aware of the 
possibility of this with the guidance acknowledging that there is evidence 
that the WAIS-IV may not be as accurate when used in the low range as 
in the average range (Whitaker 2012), and drawing a distinction between 
IQ and “true IQ”, implying that they are not always the same. However, 
on the other hand, the guidance does not given any indication as to the 
degree of this inaccuracy or take account of it in the definition.  
 
It may be helpful to briefly outline the evidence for the lack of IQ tests 
in the low range:   The 95% confidence interval (the interval either side of the 
measured IQ where the “true IQ” supposedly has a 95% chance of 
lying), which is recommended in the guidance and the test manuals, 
is mainly based on the internal consistency of the test and not the 
stability of the test (the degree to which a test will give the same 
result if given more than once to the same person). This means 
that this 95% confidence interval does not take account of  the 
change in scores that occur when the test was repeated. In a meta 
analysis of test re-test reliability of IQ assessments in the low 
range, Whitaker (2008b) found that the weighted mean test re 
test reliability score was .82, equivalent to a 95% confidence 
interval of 12.5 points for stability, and that 14% of re-tested IQs 
differed by 10 points or more from the original. It would seem to 
be disingenuous to state that the true IQ is within four points of 
the measured IQ (which is what is stated in the WAIS-IV manual) 
if there is a .14 chance that, if the assessment was repeated the 
next day, the new score would differ by 10 or more points from the 
original one.  
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 There is now evidence that commonly used IQ tests don’t agree 
with each other in the low IQ range. Gordon et al (2010) found the 
WISC-IV measured on average 12 points less than the WAIS-III 
with to 16-year-olds in special education. Silverman et al (2010) 
compared the Stanford Binet assessments and WAIS assessments 
with adults with ID and found that the WAIS measured higher by 
nearly 17 points. Grondhuis and Mulick (2013) found that the 
Leiter-R measured higher than the Stanford Binet-V by an average 
of 21 points when given to children with autistic spectrum 
disorders. Although the guidance does acknowledge that there may 
be some problems with the accuracy of the Leiter, there is no 
indication that the disparity between IQ tests is as great as the 
evidence suggests it is. As the guidance fails to make this clear it 
may be the case that many psychologists are unaware of this and 
will assume that a score on one IQ test is equivalent to the score 
on another IQ test. Even if there is a general awareness the 
situation, at the moment we don’t know which assessments are 
accurate and which are in error. This clearly matters when one is 
trying to estimate an individual’s true level of intellectual ability in 
order to make a diagnosis. It has been suggested (Whitaker 2015) 
that one way of reducing this problem, though certainly not 
eliminating it, would be to make the IQ part of the definition 
explicitly a WAIS-IV IQ. Then if other tests are used the scores 
on these tests could be adjusted so they are equivalent to WAIS-
IV IQs. However, for this to work effectively we would need a lot 
more data about how other tests compare with the WAIS-IV in 
the low range, which we don’t have at the moment.   
  
Whitaker (2013) has suggested that, when these and other errors are 
taken into account, the true confidence interval, in the low range, is more 
like 20 points rather than the 4 to 5 points claimed in the test manuals: a 
level of accuracy far too small to have a stated IQ cut off point as part 
of the definition of ID.  
  
Adaptive behaviour cut-off points have been introduced 
It is a requirement of the definition that the individual should score 
2SDs below the population mean on at least one of: conceptual, practical, 
or social skills subscales of adaptive behaviour or on the composite scale. 
This therefore requires an assessment that has been normed against the 
general population and has normally distributed scores.  The guidance 
recommends the Vineland-II or the ABAS-II are used, both of which were 
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normed on a stratified sample of the population and give standard scores with a 
mean of 100 and SD of 15, and so theoretically can be used to assesses if an 
individual scores above or below the cut off point at 2SDs below the population 
mean. However, there are a number of reasons why the use of these scales with 
a 2 SD cut off point may fail to correctly categorise individuals who are able to 
cope in the real world from those who are not able to:   
 
First, as with IQ, 2 SDs below the mean is an arbitrary figure. There is no 
empirical evidence that the current author is aware of that people who 
score 2 SDs below the norm on a scale of adaptive behaviour are any less 
likely to cope in the real world than those who score at either 2.5 SDs or 
1.5 SDs below the population mean.  
 
Second, adaptive behaviour scales seem to be even less accurate than IQ 
tests (Whitaker 2013). These scales are subject to the same chance 
errors as are IQ scales, such as a lack of internal consistency and a lack 
of stability but there is an additional sources of error inherent in having 
to use an informant to provide information about the individual being 
assessed. The degree to which the informant knows the individual will 
vary, the setting in which they have seen the individual may be limited and 
they may have personal reasons for wanting to present the individual as 
either capable or incapable. Whitaker (2013) has estimated the true 95% 
confidence interval of a composite measure of adaptive behaviour, when 
all relevant sources of chance error are taken into account, is about 18 
points. The tests are, however, not only subject to chance error: there are 
also a number of systematic errors: a floor effect on the Vineland-II causing it 
to produce a higher score for children than for adults in the low range; there 
are some differences between the scores on different measures of adaptive 
behaviour; there is a systematic difference between the rating of parents and 
teachers, with parents tending to rate their children as more capable (Harrison 
1987) and there is a possibility of people deliberately faking scores which is 
difficult to detect (Doane and Salekin 2009). Acknowledging that it is difficult 
to calculate an exact interval, Whitaker (2013) estimates the true 95% 
confidence interval, for adaptive behaviour scales in the measurement of 
adaptive behaviour in the low range, when both chance and systematic error is 
taken into account, is of the order of about 20 above the measured score for 
both adults and children, 20 points below for adults and 30 points below for 
children. Although the guidance does note that there may be problems with the 
personal bias of respondents it does not indicate the degree of error that may 
occur when it comes to assessing an individual’s “true” level of adaptive 
behaviour. As with IQ this error would seem to be far too great to base a 
definition of ID on the measured score and a large proportion of individuals who 
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are allocated as having a true level of adaptive behaviour either above or below 
2 SDs below the mean will be wrong.  
 
Third, as the scores on adaptive behaviour scales is an average of the 
individual items it may not indicate when an individual has a key deficit 
that prevents them from functioning adequate. Greenspan et al (2011) 
point out that a key element of ID is naivety, which can result in the 
individual being taken advantage of by others, for example to get involved 
in crime, lend money etc. This may not be reflected in an adaptive 
behaviour score if the individual has good linguistic, social and practical 
skills, but could stop him/her being able to cope adequately. If the 
definition of ID in the guidance is applied strictly when it comes to 
adaptive behaviour there may well be individuals who have both measured 
IQs and true intellectual abilities below 70, who are vulnerable to 
exploitation but are nonetheless refused a diagnosis and subsequent ID 
services as they score above the adaptive behaviour cut-off points.   
 
The definition requires that an individual should fulfil each of the 
three criteria 
The guidance is quite clear that for a diagnosis of ID the individual 
should fulfil each of the three criteria. Although this is consistent with 
the internationally recognised definitions of ID there are some problems 
inherent in this:   The age criteria of 18 is largely arbitrary and there may well be 
cases where for clinical reasons it makes more sense for it not to 
be applied strictly. For example, if an adolescent receives 
neurological damage resulting in them meeting the other two 
criteria but has a very mixed picture of cognitive abilities, they 
may well be better seen by neurological rehabilitation services 
rather than ID services.   The requirement that an individual should have both a significant 
impairment intellectual ability and adaptive behaviour will mean 
that individuals who have a true intellectual ability below 70 but a 
measured adaptive behaviour level in the low normal range would 
not be diagnosed as ID. As noted above, this could result in some 
individuals who need an ID service not being given one if they fail 
to fulfil the adaptive behaviour part of the definition, even if they 
have a true intellectual ability below 70. This may be a particular 
problem with regard to service provision of psychological therapies.  
There is evidence that CBT needs to be modified in order to be 
effective with individuals with intellectual abilities below 70 
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(Whitaker 2001), however, if an individual with a true intellectual 
ability below 70 fails to get a diagnosis due to scoring too highly on 
a measure of adaptive behaviour then they very well may not be 
seen by a psychologist specialising in working with individuals with 
ID. 
 
 
Other issues with the guidance  
There are a number of other points in the guidance that may cause 
confusion to a psychologist trying to apply the recommendations.  
 
 Reasons for inaccurate scores 
The guide states that although there are a lot of factors that may 
reduce IQ scores the only major factor that can increase scores is 
teaching the test (coaching) for verbal subtests and too short a test-
retest interval for performance (non-verbal) subsets (a practice effect). 
The implication of this is that, in the absence of evidence for coaching or 
practice, that, if there are two IQ scores, then the higher one is most 
likely to be accurate. However, the working group may have failed to 
consider other factors that may result in a score being artificially 
increased, which would include:  The Flynn effect, whereby older IQ tests, measure higher than 
new ones by the order of 0.3 of a point per year since the test was 
standardized (Flynn 2007).   The Floor effect, which would increase scores when an individual’s 
true ability on a subtest is lower than the minimum scaled score of 
one, and/or when their true IQ is below the minimum IQ of 40 
(Whitaker and Wood 2008, Whitaker and Gordon 2012).   Other factors causing systematic difference between tests in the 
low range that we know occur. For example, as noted above, the 
WAIS-III/IV may measure too high by the order of 10 points, for 
reasons we as yet don’t understand.       A higher score may occur by chance. Simply taking account of the 
95% confidence intervals of about 4 points reported in the WAIS-
IV test manuals, 2.5% of scores will be above this interval. This, 
however, does not take into account the lack of stability of the 
test which if included would take the 95% confidence interval to 
about 7 points for the WAIS-IV (Whitaker 2013). Therefore one 
would expect that 2.5% of the standardization sample, who would 
have taken the test under optimal conditions, to score 7 points or 
more above thier true IQs.  
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Reporting scores 
There seems to be some inconsistency in the advice the guide gives on 
how scores are to be reported. On page 28 it states: “The Society is 
mindful of a tendency amongst non-psychologists to misinterpret the 
results of psychometric assessment measures presented in the form of 
single, standardised scores (such as IQs). The Society, therefore, 
strongly recommends that neither individual IQ scores nor their 
equivalents in respect to adaptive behaviour measures should be cited in 
psychological assessment reports.” This is to be welcomed as it is 
certainly the experience of the current author that non-psychologists can 
focus on the stated score and ignore everything else in the report. 
However the guide then says: “the psychologist’s opinion as to the 
individual’s true level of both intellectual functioning and adaptive 
behaviour should be presented and discussed. This will involve detailing 
not just the actual ranges of scores derived throughout the assessment, 
but also the extent to which the psychologist, using his/her clinical 
judgment.” (P.29). This suggests that scores of some sort should be 
presented. There is also a specific issue with citing a range of scores 
instead of the measured IQ score, in that, as shown above, the 95% 
confidence intervals provided in the manuals are a gross underestimate of 
the true 95% confidence interval (Whitaker 2008a; 2013).     
    
Clinical judgment 
There is an increased emphasis on clinical judgment, which is to be 
welcomed. The need to interpret and explain the results of the 
assessments is important, given the problems with the accuracy of tests 
and how scores can be interpreted by non-psychologiests.  It has been 
suggested (Webb and Whitaker 2012, Whitaker 2008b, 2013) that, due 
to the inaccuracy of measurement, IQ and adaptive behaviour cut off 
points should no longer be part of the definition of ID and that the 
decision as to whether an individual has an ID should be largely based on 
clinical judgment. The guide does not go that far, cut off points are 
retained and it is implicit that the guidance considers that the measures 
of IQ and adaptive behaviour are as accurate as is claimed in their 
manuals. The use of clinical judgment seems therefore to be confined to 
situations where scores fall within the 95% confidence interval according 
to the test manuals and where there are more exceptional circumstances, 
for example where a formal IQ test cannot be given. However, the 
wording of the guidance seems sufficiently ambiguous, so that clinicians 
who are aware of the poor accuracy of measures of IQ and adaptive 
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behaviour can use clinical judgment over a greater range of measured IQs 
and adaptive behaviour scores.   
 
 
Conclusions 
To conclude, the guidance does have some things to commend it, with the 
increased emphasis on adaptive behaviour, and clinical judgment and in 
acknowledgement that there may be problems with the measurement of 
low IQ. However, the definition of ID adopted is very much in line with 
internationally recognized definitions, which are based on assumptions 
about how accurately an individual’s intellectual ability and level of 
adaptive behaviour can be measured which are increasingly being shown to 
be wrong. It is a pity that the working group did not take the opportunity 
to produce a radically different definition of ID based on clinical 
judgment.  
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